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Summary 
Discourse always matters in the politics of building social pacts on social protection —for failure as 
much as for success.1
Which set of ideas wins out in the politics of building social pacts does not only depend on the ideas 
qua ideas —what they are, whether they are objects of consensus, whether they can work, or whether they 
are defended regardless of their workability, as a matter of interest, identity and/or group solidarity.  
 And by discourse, I mean not just the ideas behind the social pacts but the policy 
debates and political discussions surrounding the negotiation of those pacts. Over the past three decades, 
with globalization a major driving force in the international economy, new social pacts have been 
negotiated and older ones renegotiated. Many of these negotiations have been underpinned by neo-
liberal ideas focused on increasing flexibility in labor markets through greater management ability to 
hire and fire at will, on improving worker productivity or reducing unemployment through labor market 
activation policies, and on cutting the costs of the welfare state through reducing benefits and 
introducing competition in services. But they have also been moderated by social-democratic and social 
liberal ideas emphasizing respect for workers’ rights and job protections, the improvement of working 
hours, working conditions, and worker training, and the maintenance or enhancement of workers’ 
benefits and social services over the lifecycle. Most notable is how much has changed as labor and social 
policies designed for old social risks have been redesigned to address new social risks. In the process, 
institutions have been transformed and interests not just realigned but reconceptualized. 
It is also about power, although not only the coercive powers of the different parties in the 
negotiation to impose their interests —whether management, labor, and governments. It is equally about 
the discursive powers of such actors —especially in the case of innovative social pacts— to persuade 
those involved in the discussion to compromise, or even to change their perceptions of their interests 
and/or of what is appropriate with regard to values. Such discursive power can be complicated, however. 
It may depend not only on how the actors involved in the negotiations coordinate agreement behind 
closed doors but also on how they communicate their views to the public, which in turn depends on how 
                                                        
1  There is no need here to go back to questions about whether discourse has a causal influence, which now seems generally accepted 
(Schmidt 2002a, 2002b; Ferrera 2013; Hemerijck 2013, p. 97-102).  
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their pronouncements are mediated in public debates by the media (newspapers, television, and internet), 
discussed by politicians, opinion leaders, and experts, and responded to by social movements, labor 
activists, and the everyday citizen, all of which may then affect how the actors in negotiations may 
reconsider and revise their positions (Schmidt 2000, 2002a, 2006). 
Discourse itself therefore should be understood not only as embodying ideas about the substantive 
content of social pacts on social protection but also as representing the interactive processes of 
coordination and communication that generate such pacts. Context also matters, however. This includes 
not only the political economic institutions —in particular whether countries have more decentralized 
systems based on individualized contracts or more coordinated labor-management negotiations, decided 
with or without the state —but also the political institutions— especially whether the country is a 
‘simple’ polity with governing authority channeled through the executive or is a more ‘compound polity’ 
with diffused authority; and if the sector tends to be a ‘multi-actor’ system with many veto players as 
opposed to a ‘single-actor’ system where one player has a monopoly on decision-making (Schmidt 2000, 
2002a, 2006). Moreover, one additionally needs to take into account the policy problems precipitating 
consideration of new social pacts, the policy legacies of earlier pacts, and the ‘politics’ of right and left, 
along with culture and history (Schmidt 2002a, 2003). Put another way, we also need to pay attention to 
the path-dependent formal rules and regularities that historical institutionalists would consider, the 
rationalist interest-based politics that are the focus of rational choice institutionalists, and the cultural 
meanings and norms that sociological institutionalists would explore (Hall and Taylor 1996; Thelen 
1999; Finnemore 1996). All these serve usefully as background information to the investigation of ideas 
and discourse undertaken in this paper (Schmidt 2008, 2010). 
The framework for analysis used in this paper is what I call ‘discursive institutionalism’ because 
it considers the substantive content of ideas and the interactive process of discourse in institutional 
context (Schmidt 2002a, Ch. 5, 2006, Ch. 5, 2008, 2010). The ideas may be developed through cognitive 
arguments about their necessity or normative arguments about their appropriateness (Jobert 1989; 
Schmidt 2002a); they may come at different levels of generality, including policy, programs, and 
philosophy (Berman 1998; Schmidt 2008; Mehta 2011); they may appear in different forms, such as 
narratives (Roe l994), frames (Rein and Schön 1994), frames of reference (Jobert 1989; Muller 1995), 
paradigms (Jobert 1989; Hall 1993; Schmidt 2002a), discursive fields of ideas (Bourdieu 1990; Torfing 
1999), argumentative practices (Fischer and Forester 1993; Fischer and Gottweis 2012), storytelling 
(Forester 1993), and collective memories (Rothstein 2005); and they may change at different rates, either 
incrementally through evolutionary processes (Berman 1998; Steinmo 2010) or in revolutionary shifts 
(Hall 1993; Blyth 2002). The discursive interactions may involve policy actors in discourse coalitions 
(Hajer 1993), epistemic communities (Haas 1992), and advocacy coalitions (Sabatier 1993) engaged in a 
‘coordinative’ discourse of policy construction as well as political actors engaged in a ‘communicative’ 
discourse of deliberation, contestation, and legitimization of the policies with the public (Schmidt 2002a 
ch. 5, 2006 ch. 5, 2008, 2010a). Such ‘communicative action’ (Habermas 1989) may involve informed 
publics of the media, opinion leaders, intellectuals, experts, and ‘policy forums’ of organized interests 
(Rein and Schön 1994) as well as the more general public of ordinary people and civil society (Zaller 
1992; Mutz, Sniderman, and Brody 1996).  
In both the policy and political spheres, moreover, some actors may serve as ‘ideational’ policy 
entrepreneurs (Kingdon 1984) or leaders (Stiller 2010) —whether ideological, because they are fully 
committed to a given philosophy; pragmatic, because they cobble policy and programmatic ideas 
together, without a doctrinaire commitment to an underlying philosophy; or opportunistic, because they 
use ideas often temporarily with little commitment, mainly to gain political power (Schmidt and 
Thatcher 2013; Schmidt and Woll 2013). Although such entrepreneurs are mostly depicted as national or 
supranational elites making top-down policy, they can also be cast as activists in labor and social 
movements with bottom-up policy effects (Keck and Sikkink 1998; Epstein 2008; see also Schmidt 
2008). The institutional context, moreover, should be considered not only in the historical, rationalist, or 
sociological institutionalist terms discussed above. It should also be understood in terms of the meaning 
context in which agents’ ideas develop as well as of the nationally situated logics of communication in 
which discursive interactions proceed. Agents’ ideas, discourse, and actions in any institutional context, 
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however, must also be seen as responses to the material (and not so material) realities which affect them 
—including material events, structures, and pressures, the unintended consequences of their own actions, 
the actions of others, and the ideas and discourse of others as they attempt to make sense of all such 
realities (Schmidt 2008).  
In what follows, I use discursive institutionalism to examine in greater detail both the ideational 
content of social pacts on social protection and the discursive processes of their construction and 
communication in different contexts. In so doing, I explore a wide range of empirical examples in the 
transformations of social protection regimes since the 1980s in response to the pressures of globalization 
as well as of Europeanization, with special attention to the social pacts following the Eurozone sovereign 
debt crisis. Part I considers ideas about social protection and the various ways in which to explain 
ideational change in social pacts. Here, the focus is on the clash between neo-liberal and social 
democratic or social liberal principles with regard to work and welfare, with illustrations from a range of 
advanced industrialized countries. The second part explores the discursive interactions involved in the 
construction and public communication about social pacts, along with the framing of more specific 
policy ideas and programs. This part examines a wide variety of cases, taking paired comparisons of 
countries that may have similar forms of capitalist regimes but differ in their approaches to labor 
coordination or welfare provision. These include UK vs. Ireland for liberal market economies; Germany 
vs. the Netherlands and Sweden vs. Denmark for coordinated market economies; France vs. Italy for 
state-influenced market economies, and Brazil vs. South Africa for emerging economies.  
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I.  Ideas about social protection and changes  
in the content of social pacts 
The baseline for ideas about social protection generally follow along the lines of the postwar social-
democratic settlement, in which workers were to be guaranteed labor rights, wage coordination 
functions, and social protections that were expected to increase over time. Such ideas could be cast as 
the post-war ‘paradigm,’ following Thomas Kuhn (1970; e.g., Jobert 1989; Majone 1989; Hall 1993; 
Schmidt 2002; Skogstad 2012), or, following Karl Polanyi (1945), as the ideational result of the social 
counter-movement to the classical liberal ideas that spurred the market movement of the 1920s and early 
1930s, and led to the Great Depression. These postwar neo-Keynesian social democratic ideas came to 
be seriously challenged by neo-liberalism beginning in the 1970s, as policymakers sought a way out of 
the serious economic crisis caused by the two oil shocks, and could be seen as having produced a market 
counter-movement to the earlier social counter-movement to the market. While the adoption or 
adaptation of neo-liberal ideas may have come suddenly for some countries, appearing as a paradigm 
shift in the UK (Hall 1993) or a great transformational moment in the US and Sweden (Blyth 2002), in 
others it came more slowly, as more of an evolutionary or incremental process, as in Germany, France 
(Schmidt 2002; Palier 2005) and Denmark (Benner and Vlad 2000). 
As a general philosophy, neo-liberalism entails belief in competitive markets enhanced by 
globally free trade and capital mobility, backed up by a pro-market, limited state that promotes labor 
market flexibility and seeks to reduce welfare dependence while marketizing the provision of public 
goods (see Hay 2004; Peck 2010; Schmidt and Thatcher 2013).  
With regard to labour markets in particular, neo-liberal ideas challenged the post-war ideal of 
organization via corporatist relations between management and unions, with a new frame in which 
businesses were to determine wages in decentralized labour markets, while labour unions were largely 
written out of the script. Multinational businesses in particular largely reconceptualized their interests in 
this way, even in corporatist countries, as they increasingly pressured unions to agree to greater 
flexibility in wages and working conditions and governments to legislate ‘structural reform’ (Crouch 
2011; Jackson and Schnyder 2013; Martin 2013). As for the welfare state, in its original formulation, 
following Hayek (1944) and Friedman (1962), this was to be rolled back to a basic minimum in order to 
ensure individuals taking responsibility for themselves and their families.  
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The main focus of neo-liberalism in the 1970s was macroeconomic reform through fiscal 
consolidation and ‘hard money’ policies, but success in this area was seen as necessarily also entailing 
reform of labor markets and welfare systems. By the 1980s, work and welfare reform came onto the 
agenda in a range of advanced industrialized countries, and by the 1990s was everywhere (Scharpf 2000; 
Hemerijck 2000). With regard to work, neo-liberal ideas were largely concerned with increasing 
flexibility in labor markets by easing rules for hiring and firing, promoting part-time and temporary jobs, 
and decentralizing bargaining on wages and work conditions to sectoral and firm levels. With regard to 
welfare, the objects of reform tended to be of two different types: the ‘old’ social risks, involving 
pension systems, disability schemes, and health care systems generally designed during the postwar 
period and benefiting older workers and ‘insiders’, and those targeting the ‘new’ social risks, focused on 
the ‘outsiders’ who benefited least from the postwar welfare state, who tended to be younger, female, or 
immigrant, and who may be without work, without skills, or on welfare. Neo-liberal ideas for new risk 
reforms largely concentrated on work-related issues, and emphasized labor market activation policies 
such as education, training, and job-seeker aid along with welfare-to-work programs for the young and 
the long-term unemployed or child-care services (and to a lesser extent elderly care) for women, to free 
them up for work (Taylor-Gooby 2004). All of this was to ensure ‘equality of opportunity’ rather than 
the ‘equality of results,’ or redistribution, which was at the heart of the social policies related to the ‘old’ 
risks, for which ideas for reform were mainly concerned with reducing cutting the welfare rolls to 
encourage individual responsibility, the generosity of benefits, and cutting costs in social services, 
mainly by increasing their marketization. 
The philosophical ideas behind reforms of both work and welfare were almost always neo-liberal, 
but the programmatic and policy ideas shifted over time. From the 1980s to early 1990s, conservative 
parties’ neo-liberal ideas were tied to the ‘roll-back’ of the state to leave room for the market —by cutting 
welfare on old social risks and increasing labor market flexibility by reducing workers’ job protections and 
also, in some states, their capacity for collective action. This gave way beginning in the mid to late 1990s 
to social-democratic parties’ neo-liberal ideas tied to the ‘roll-out’ of the state to enhance market 
competition, which were more concerned about addressing new social risks via ‘active labor market 
policy.’ Once the Eurozone’s sovereign debt crisis hit beginning in 2010, moreover, neo-liberal ideas 
attached to the ‘ramp-up’ of the supranational ‘state’ (that is, the European Union) returned to state roll-
back on welfare spending even as it continued state roll-out on ‘structural reforms’ (Schmidt and Woll 
2013), often accompanied by state imposition of new restrictive social pacts.2
With regard to labor markets, for example, in Anglophone ‘liberal market economies’ in the 
1980s, neo-liberalism promoted views that led to a transformational change in labor relations, by 
encouraging the state’s smashing of unions in order to end the negotiation of any kind of social pacts. 
This was most notably the goal of ideational leaders both in the US, with President Reagan ideologically 
committed to breaking up the PATCO air traffic controllers’ strike of 1982 and in the UK, with Prime 
Minister Thatcher equally committed to crushing the coal miners’ strike of 1984. For the ideational 
leaders of these countries, organized labor was to be eliminated in order to free up the markets. In much 
smaller Ireland, unlike in the US and the UK, the government’s pragmatic leadership in the mid 1980s 
promoted the idea that it was more useful for ‘competitiveness’ and more appropriate in terms of 
national values to organize workers in a more coordinated negotiation process that led to successive 
social pacts (Teague and Donaghey 2004; Hay and Smith 2005).  
 Across these three periods, 
the ideas underlying the social pacts that were negotiated —or imposed— were necessarily different. This 
was not only because of the different reform ideas in each period but also because of differences in national 
contexts. Neo-liberal ideas were adopted and adapted in different countries to differing effects at different 
times in different ways. There are, in other words, many different national variants in terms of policies and 
programs, even where the underlying philosophy is neo-liberal. And such differences are even apparent in 
countries that share similar political economic institutions. 
                                                        
2  Schmidt and Woll (2013) note that this increase in state activity, which goes against neo-liberalism’s fundamental principle of a 
limited state, has produced a new synthesis that they call ‘liberal neo-statism’. 
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In Continental and Northern European ‘coordinated market economies,’ by contrast with US and 
UK liberal market economies, there was no significant attack on the idea of coordination itself, just on 
the kinds of social protections it provided. Social pacts between management and labor —whether with 
or without state involvement— were often renegotiated to accommodate neo-liberal ideas about how to 
make economies more ‘competitive’ without direct attempts to undermine the power of labor, let alone 
to smash unions, although labor was indeed often weakened as a result (Jackson and Schnyder 2013). In 
countries like Germany and Sweden, this has also produced a kind of ‘corporatist-managed 
liberalisation’ in which social pacts integrated key principles of neo-liberalism such as using markets to 
allocate resources or increasing competition, and in which the ‘social partners’ were important 
participants in promoting the international competitiveness of firms. That said, whereas in Germany, 
ideas about liberalisation focused on seeking competitiveness through low wage and welfare costs 
without undermining key beliefs about such matters as co-determination in ‘core’ parts of the labour 
market, in Sweden, liberalizing ideas centered on aiding the rise of high-technology sectors and risk 
venture capital, not on reducing the higher wage and welfare costs appreciably, although they did also 
introduce competition in service provision (Jackson and Schnyder 2013).  
All such countries, regardless of capitalist market economy, adopted labor market activation 
policies, influenced by the diffusion of ideas from other countries (in particular Scandinavia), that were 
also facilitated by the EU’s ‘open method of coordination’ (Pochet and Zeitlin 2005). But employers’ 
active engagement in such policies, and their concomitant success, differed greatly between the liberal 
UK, where employers for the most part didn’t commit themselves or their resources, and coordinated 
Denmark, where they were actively committed to it. Here, the differences can be explained not only by 
employers’ very different ideas about their responsibility for worker training but also by the institutional 
arrangements and path dependencies that discourage employer coordination on training programs in the 
one country, encourage it in the other (Martin 2013).  
While in the work arena, then, neo-liberal principles came to be either substituted for postwar 
social democratic principles, or intertwined with them, in the welfare arena social democratic ideas 
remained the predominant underlying philosophy in most social policy sectors, in particular in areas of 
universal provision (see Rothstein 1998), even as neo-liberal ideas may have been layered on top. Thus, 
for example, social-democratic or social liberal (e.g., Rawlsian) views of the normative appropriateness 
of social provision remained, even as a number of more neo-liberal measures were accepted as 
(cognitively) necessary, such as means-testing for social assistance, taxation for pensions, or introducing 
competition into healthcare systems. This is why (national) state reforms of the welfare state have led to 
a new synthesis in most advanced industrialized countries that Maurizio Ferrera (2013) characterizes as 
‘liberal neo-welfarism,’ because neo-liberal ideas are joined with principles of social justice as the basis 
for welfare provision. This new synthesis can be seen not only in traditionally liberal welfare states like 
the UK but even in the seemingly ideal-typical social-democratic welfare states such as Sweden and 
Denmark, which grafted neo-liberal ideas onto their welfare systems, freeing up markets without giving 
up their basic values of equality and universalism (Schmidt 2000; Jackson and Schnyder 2013). Notably, 
this synthesis maintains the neo-liberal emphasis on ‘negative freedom’ (from state interference) and 
individual responsibility but extends its reach to new areas such as non-discrimination on grounds of 
gender, sexuality, or racial origins, balancing equality of opportunity with that of outcome, and ensuring 
that workers should be assisted in order to become ‘fit for work’ (Ferrera 2013). In terms of ideational 
content, this new synthesis has also been termed the ‘social investment’ welfare state (Hemerijck 2013). 
With the Eurozone sovereign debt crisis, policy ideas linked to (national) state rollback returned 
to the fore, even as state rollout continued. But the ramp up of (supranational) state intervention by the 
EU with the advent of the Eurozone crisis was also significant. This came in the form of a generalized 
acceptance of austerity across European countries, beginning in May 2010, led by German Chancellor 
Merkel, under the assumption that only in this way could the EU return to economic health as well as 
remain ‘credible’ to the markets. Instead of continued pragmatic (somewhat neo-Keynesian) policy in a 
time of economic slow-down or recession as in the US, then, European countries accepted a more 
ideologically neo-liberal or, better, ‘ordo-liberal’ (read neo-liberalism with rules) approach that 
emphasized ‘sound finances’ and belt-tightening in response to economic crisis (Gamble 2013; Schmidt 
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and Thatcher 2013). This had long been Germany’s macroeconomic philosophy, as embodied in the 
Bundesbank’s approach to central bank policymaking, and had been generalized to the rest of Europe 
through its embedding in European Monetary Union and the European Central Bank’s Charter. Such a 
philosophy translated into the commitment to engineering state roll back through a return to the numbers 
expected in the Stability and Growth Pact (SGP) of no more than 3% deficit and 60% debt. On the 
agenda was therefore rapid deficit reduction via such measures as cutting state spending, reducing public 
payrolls and welfare costs, and ‘structural reform’ via increases in labor market flexibility. Moreover, for 
countries requiring Eurozone assistance via a loan bailout either directly —Greece— or via the European 
Financial Stability Facility (EFSF) —Ireland, Portugal— the Troika (European Central Bank, European 
Commission, and IMF) strictly enforced these conditions. Such conditionality was soon also applied to 
those countries in danger of needing such a bailout that were ‘too big to fail’ —Spain and Italy— while 
other countries seen as increasing weak were also urged to reform, such as France most recently. And all 
of this was reinforced by successive pacts, such as the Euro-Plus pact, the ‘two-pack,’ the ‘six pack’ and 
so on that focused on more and more stringent enforcement of the SGP criteria. The result has been 
tremendous pressure in both work and welfare arenas, as governments have sought to renegotiate 
previous social pacts with the social partners in efforts to  
Paying attention to the substantive content of ideas helps show the complexities of neo-liberal 
influence on change in social pacts as well as the social-democratic pushback. But we are still missing 
an explanation of the dynamics of change. And this is all about discourse not as the embodiment of ideas 
but as an interactive process of the conveying and exchanging of ideas, where the ability to persuade 
one’s interlocutors about the value and necessity of one’s ideas, and not just to impose one’s interests, 
also matters. 
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II. Discursive processes of interaction  
in the building of social pacts 
To understand the negotiation and renegotiation of social pacts we need to consider not only the 
substantive content of the discourse, that is, what is said, written, and understood in the social pacts, but 
equally the discursive interactions, or who talks to whom about what where and why in the construction 
of any such pacts. And for this, we need to take account not only of the coordinative discourse involved 
in the processes of construction and agreement on social pacts in the policy sphere but also the 
communicative discourse of legitimization of social pacts in the political sphere. Ideally, the two sphere 
are fully interconnected, such that the policy ideas developed in the coordinative discourse —often more 
heavily weighted toward cognitive justification— are generally translated by political actors into 
language and arguments accessible to the general public for debate and deliberation as part of a 
communicative discourse that also adds normative legitimation, to ensure that the policy and 
programmatic ideas resonate with the philosophical frames of the polity (see Schmidt 2006:255-7). This 
said, the coordinative and communicative discourses don’t always connect with one another, and this is 
where problems may arise for social pacts, in particular where policy actors justify their agreement using 
one set of arguments in the coordinative policy sphere, while political actors legitimate them with 
another set in the communicative political sphere. Moreover, such negotiations can go very wrong 
indeed where what is said in the policy sphere behind closed doors contradicts what is said in the 
political sphere, especially if this is found out and communicated, say, by the media (see Schmidt 2002a, 
Ch. 5, 2002b, 2006, Ch. 5).  
Ideational leaders also matter here, in particular government leaders, because governments are 
necessarily key to the negotiation of new social pacts, as well as to the destruction of old ones. The ways 
in which they lead ideationally are complex. To simplify, I have used the three-fold division between 
ideological, pragmatic, and opportunistic ideational leaders to differentiate among ideological leaders 
who hold to the ideas they seek to institute, pragmatic leaders who are willing to compromise, and 
opportunists who are more interested in gaining and maintaining power (Schmidt and Thatcher 2013; 
Schmidt and Woll 2013). Another way of thinking about this —as used in party politics literature 
focused on political actors’ motivations— could be in terms of leaders who are ‘policy-seeking’ 
(ideological and pragmatic) and therefore tend to hold to a particular set of ideas, whether or not they 
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compromise on them, or ‘office-seeking’ (opportunistic), because they are willing to switch whenever 
useful (Marx and Schumacher 2013). 
Institutional configurations naturally also make a difference. Political economic institutions  
—liberal, coordinated, or state-influenced— set the patterns and rules of negotiation that are clearly very 
important for understanding discursive interactions, as are the political institutions that tend to be on a 
continuum from simple to compound polities, or from single to multi-actor sectoral systems. Thus, in 
liberal market economies nowadays, business tends to be able to make decisions autonomously with 
comparatively little obstruction by labor as well as little interference from governments where they so 
decide. This has made for highly decentralized wage bargaining and no social pacts as such in the UK. But 
where the government decides to intervene, as in Ireland, highly centralized and coordinated social pacts 
can result. In coordinated market economies, in contrast, business tends to make decisions in conjunction 
with labor, through wage bargaining coordination centralized at different levels, either national (Denmark), 
sectoral (Sweden) or regional (Germany), sometimes with state involvement (e.g., the Netherlands, 
Denmark, and Sweden) sometimes not, when the rules are set by public law (Germany) (Schmidt and 
Scharpf 2000). In state-influenced market economies, differently again, business is often able to act 
autonomously where there are individualized contracts, but the state may nevertheless intervene via 
generalizing wage agreements and providing job protections (in France) or through ‘state-led’ coporatism, 
by leading corporatist coordination when it so decides (Italy) (Schmidt 2002, 2009; Howell 2009). Finally, 
in emerging market economies, any one of the three patterns just described may be operative, largely 
depending upon government will, levels of labor organization, and business cooperation.  
Governments’ involvement also often depends upon history, organization, and capacity. In single 
actor sectors and/or simple polities, the unitary state often has greater capacity to impose either 
decentralized or coordinated wage bargaining (e.g., the UK and France for decentralized, Ireland for 
coordinated) than in more compound polities. This is where the state may be federal (Germany) or 
regionalized (Italy) or, despite being unitary (Sweden, the Netherlands, Denmark), business and labor 
are highly organized actors with whom negotiation is unavoidable, unless they decide not to be involved 
(as in Sweden and the Netherlands at different junctures on welfare reform, when the unitary 
configuration of the state enabled it to act effectively).  
A.  Liberal market economies: UK and Ireland  
The UK and Ireland, despite having much in common as Anglophone liberal market economies with the 
same kind of growth model focused on financialization (Hay and Smith 2013), differ significantly, in 
particular with regard to social pacts on social protection. Whereas Thatcher, once elected, set about 
destroying any possibility for social pacts by smashing the unions in the early 1980s, Ireland, after 
having adopted the British approach to unions in that same period, switched and began coordinative 
discourses with labor and other groups that led to successfully negotiated social pacts until the financial 
crisis of 2008, at which point such negotiation was abandoned.  
The interesting story with regard to the UK is on welfare reform. While Thatcher managed to 
eliminate the possibility of opposition by organized labor (in destroying it) she was nevertheless stymied 
by the opposition of the general public. Significantly, although public opinion polls show that by the mid 
to late 1980s, Thatcher’s communicative discourse about the ‘enterprise culture,’ the value of hard work, 
and ‘the right to be unequal’ enabled her to convince the public to accept neo-liberalism and the value of 
merit over equality, they also indicate that Thatcher’s communicative discourse contrasting the “worthy 
poor” with “the feckless and the idle” did not resonate with a public that remained concerned about the 
poor and valued the universal benefits of the national health service (Taylor-Gooby 1991). She was 
unable to convert the country to neo-liberal welfare reform, although she was able to make cuts in areas 
other than universal services, like aid to single mothers, and to introduce more competition into universal 
services like education as well as health (Rhodes 2000). It took Labor Prime Minister Blair to complete 
Thatcher’s revolution in the welfare arena via state ‘roll-out’, with a communicative discourse that did 
resonate as it insisted on the necessity of reform resulting from the challenges posed by globalization 
(Hay and Rosamund 2002), appealed to values of equality and compassion as much as to neo-liberalism, 
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promised to “promote opportunity instead of dependence” through positive actions (i.e., workfare) rather 
than negative actions focused on limiting benefits and services, and by providing ‘not a hammock but a 
trampoline,’ not ‘a hand out but a hand up’ (Schmidt 2000; Schmidt 2002b, 2009). Subsequently, 
notably, this communicative discourse of the ‘third way’ between Tory conservatism and ‘Old Labor’ 
was replaced by similarly legitimating arguments centered around adopting Swedish labor market 
activation policies and creating an ‘Anglo-social’ model of welfare state. Under the Conservative Party 
led by PM David Cameron, by contrast, the communicative discourse switched to a more fully neo-
liberal one, back to state ‘roll-back’ by encouraging individual responsibility and promoting community 
control, in particular with the campaign discourse of ‘the Big Society,” described as an attempt to 
reframe the role of government and unleash the entrepreneurial spirit (The Times, April 14, 2010), 
although the Labor opposition leader described it as a “cloak for small government” (The Independent, 
Feb. 12, 2011)  
Ireland tended to follow the British trajectory with regard to the welfare arena, moving from a 
Thatcherite discourse about cuts to the equivalent of a ‘third way’ discourse on the reform of work and 
welfare (Hay and Smith 2005). But it followed a completely different track with regard to the work 
arena, where it was largely characterized by state-led corporatism.  
Ireland offers a fascinating case of how one country managed to create a deliberative coordinative 
discourse among not just the social partners but also civil society. In so doing, it had a radical paradigm 
shift in its approach to labor relations. This shift came in response to major economic meltdown at a 
‘critical juncture’ in 1986-1987. Although Irish leaders’ ideas and communicative discourse were similar 
to those of Thatcher with regard to the necessity of neo-liberal reforms in macro and microeconomic 
policy, and the state similarly unitary, with a capacity to impose their ideas, their approach to the labor 
markets did not follow the British pattern. Thatcher was an ideological leader who engaged in no 
coordinative discourse with labor as she radically decentralized the labor markets, crushing the unions 
and then instituting legislation to keep them down, claiming that they were the problem. By contrast, 
Irish leaders were highly pragmatic as they instead enlisted the collaboration of unions through social 
pacts. At the same time that they engaged in an elaborate coordinative discourse with a wide range of 
groups, they developed an elaborate communicative discourse to the general public in which they 
presented globalization as a non-negotiable constraint in order to ensure wage restraint and to reinforce 
the corporatist cooperation between labor, management, and government (Hay and Smith 2005). In the 
negotiation process for the social pacts, the coordinative discourse brought in a wide range of 
stakeholders in an elaborate process that has sometimes been termed ‘deliberative democracy,’ involving 
a ‘four room’ negotiating procedure —with a main room consisting of the main employer and trade 
union associations; a business room of those not involved in pay negotiations such as the Chamber of 
Commerce and Small Firms Association; a farming room; and a community room representing the 
voluntary and community sector— with bilaterals held between the different rooms, coordinated by the 
Prime Minister’s office (Teague 2006).  
Significantly such negotiations were preceded by a strategic document developed outside the hard 
bargaining arenas of government buildings, in an epistemic community, which in turn facilitated the 
emergence of a coordinative discourse on the economy focused on maintaining Ireland’s 
competitiveness in a global market. The interactive processes were key not only to reaching common 
understandings, however, but also to provide the Prime Minister with a strategic management tool for 
the economy, by getting a ‘buy-in’ from labor (Regan 2010). The countless numbers of actors at the 
local level as well as the national involved in deliberative interactions, not just the social partners but 
civil society in the form of different community groups, public interest as well as other kinds of interest 
groups, also ensured the widest possible consultation process. These wide-ranging discussions provided 
the government with a resource for ideas and a platform for designing best practice policies that also fed 
into the formal bargaining process at the national level, as these groups formally came together (Regan 
2010, 2012). But it also served as the basis for the government’s legitimating communicative discourse 
to the general public, which was reinforced by the fact that a wide range of citizens had already bought 
into the agreement as members of discursive communities in the coordinative discourse of policy 
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creation. Thus, even if one were to argue that some of the consultations did not yield much in terms of 
concrete policy, they were still useful as the legitimating tools of deliberative democracy (Teague 2006).  
Most significantly, however, in the aftermath of Ireland’s major economic crisis, social 
partnership negotiations collapsed in January 2009. This is at least in part because, unlike the 
negotiations from 1987 on, the talks were not preceded by a process of communicative exchange that led 
to shared agreement on the key issues, as embodied in a strategy document on national recovery. 
Moreover, the state-led nature of the social pacts, dependent upon the political executive, together with 
the voluntary and exclusive nature of Ireland's corporatist wage pacts, had weakened the power 
resources of labour and enabled the government to pursue a neoliberal strategy of adjustment at a 
moment of crisis (Regan 2012).  
B.  Coordinated market economies: Germany and the 
Netherlands, Sweden, and Denmark 
The trajectories of coordinated market economies have been very different between Continental 
European Germany and the Netherlands, as traditionally conservative welfare states, and Nordic Sweden 
and Denmark, as long-standing social-democratic welfare states. And yet, here too, the processes by 
which neo-liberal reforms have been coordinated and communicated provide some crosscutting 
comparisons. In coordinated market economies, governments generally do not have a choice with regard 
to pursuing coordination because the social partners are by definition part of the negotiation process in 
the work and welfare arenas. This has been the rule for Germany and Denmark, despite differing results 
with regard to the uptake of neo-liberal ideas and discourse. That said, where the social partners 
withdraw from the negotiation process, governments may decide on their own, although they generally 
do this either with the tacit approval of the social partners, or find alternatives via other kinds of 
consultations in the coordinative policy sphere or in discussions with civil society in the communicative 
political sphere. This has been true for both the Netherlands and Sweden —with again differing results.  
1.  Germany and the Netherlands 
In Germany, reform of both work and welfare was the product of a mix of ideational policy and political 
entrepreneurship, although the discursive interactions in the coordinative sphere tended to be the key to 
success (Schmidt 2009: 536-7). In the 1990s, most reform efforts were stymied by a stalemated 
coordinative discourse characterized by diverging ideas pitting management against the unions. 
Management increasingly favored neo-liberal reforms to promote labor market flexibility and rationalize 
pensions; the unions resisted such reforms, blaming European Monetary Union and macroeconomic 
policy for the lack of economic growth. In the early 2000s, however, the stalemate was overcome with 
the Hartz IV reforms. This marked a revolutionary change the effects of which are still being felt. 
The ground for the Hartz IV reforms was prepared by a communicative discourse in which neo-
liberal ideas were brought in from the outside, first by business in the main employers’ organization, the 
BDI. This then became part of a more generalized communicative discourse as government leaders 
began espousing more liberalizing ideas which were then picked up in the media and, at a time of public 
concern about continuing high unemployment, served as a spur to Chancellor Schröder’s decision to go 
ahead with the Hartz reforms of pensions and labor markets (Schmidt 2002a, 2002b; Kinderman 2005). 
The resulting reforms were extensive. But their successful negotiation cannot be attributed to Schröder 
himself, who failed to articulate a sufficiently legitimating communicative discourse about the reforms 
—in particular since he offered no normative arguments regarding the merger of unemployment 
compensation and means-tested social assistance into a single system, a development which violated the 
public’s basic beliefs about the appropriateness of an insurance-based system. The absence of a cohesive 
set of ideas or ‘frame’ helps explain the tenousness of the reform, and its subsequent partial reversal 
(Bosenecker 2008). But Schröder’s persistence in the face of plummeting popularity ratings and public 
discontent earned him some grudging respect, while it allowed time for the coordinative discourse 
among social partners and ministers to produce significant results. 
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This success can be attributed in large part to the pragmatic ‘ideational leadership’ of particular 
ministers in Schröder’s government, who ‘framed’ the terms of the coordinative discourse with the 
social partners (Stiller 2010). But it also resulted from the creation of a new coalition of political parties 
and corporate actors representing groups with very different interests who agreed to a package of 
reforms that balanced positive and negative effects, thereby producing a compromise appeal to interests 
(Häusermann 2010). The question remains open as to whether government ministers acted more as 
ideational leaders with the flow of ideas coming from top down, from ministers to the unions, political 
parties, and business associations, or as ‘brokers’ of ideas, from top to top, through a kind of 
participatory empowerment among all of these groups in the negotiations and deliberations (e.g., Fung 
and Wright 2003)? Such a process of arriving at common agreement on ideas could alternatively be 
described as one that involves ‘common knowledge creation’ through reasoned argument about cause 
and effect, as Culpepper (2008) suggests in the cases of the creation of social pacts in Ireland as well as 
in Italy (discussed below).  
But whatever the process of negotiation, the result is that German workers generally not only 
opened a breach in the labor market that allowed the tremendous expansion of part-time and temporary 
jobs in the name of flexibility, they also accepted massive wage restraint with the goal of bringing the 
country back to competitiveness, so much so that they effectively ended up with no real wage growth 
across the first decade of the 2000s (Streeck 2011). This set the stage for German public opposition to 
the bail-out of Greece, on the grounds that ‘we Germans save’ and are hard-working, as opposed to ‘the 
lazy Greeks,’ which was the public discourse throughout early 2010, prior to the loan guarantee 
agreement in May. It was only beginning in 2011 and 2012 that the unions themselves began pressing 
for their fair share, seeing the continuing profits of the corporations. But whether this means the 
negotiation of new social pacts remains to be seen. 
The Netherlands followed a different trajectory of reform, starting much earlier than Germany, 
and developing more incrementally, beginning with labor reform in the 1980s, welfare in the 1990s. 
Most notably, the Netherlands had suffered a total breakdown in its system of wage-negotiation in the 
1970s. In the early 1980s and continuing into the early 1990s, however, labor became more willing to 
negotiate adjustments in wages and work conditions to the benefit of industry. This began in response to 
the arrival of the “no-nonsense” coalition government of Christian Democrats and conservative Liberals 
in l982, with an ideological ideational leader at the head of government. The declaration of Prime 
Minister Ruud Lubbers that the government “is there to govern,” with or without the social partners’ 
consent, helped precipitate the Wassenaar agreement, which ushered in a new era of “responsive 
corporatism” with social concertation and wage restraint. With this responsive corporatism, moreover, 
came a coordinative discourse that continued through the l990s, serving as the primary manner in which 
wage restraint was maintained, wage negotiations decentralized, and work conditions made more 
flexible. By contrast, during this same period, in the welfare domain, the government engineered 
“corporatist disengagement” by progressively diminishing social partners’ powers and responsibilities 
over the administration of social programs on the grounds that the coordinative negotiation process had 
contributed to immobilism (Visser and Hemerijck, l997; Schmidt 2002b). 
Although there were moderate cutbacks in welfare state funding in the l980s, the truly radical 
liberalizing reforms that reorganized the welfare system, under governments that now included the Social 
Democrats, came in the early l990s, and these were not popular. The crisis narrative about the “tough 
medicine” that Prime Minister Lubbers, in a televised speech in l989, claimed was necessary for such a 
“sick country,” where one million of its seven million workers were out on disability insurance, did not go 
down well with either the unions, which organized the largest protest in the postwar period, or the general 
public, which saw the reforms as an attack on established rights —and which voted the government out of 
office in 1994 (Visser and Hemerijck, l997; Kuipers 2004). But this did not stop the subsequent left-Liberal 
government under Prime Minister Wim Kok, who was more of an opportunistic ideational leader (Marx 
and Schumacher 2013), from continuing with the unpopular reforms. His coalition nevertheless won a 
resounding victory in 1998. This was not only because of the success of the policies in getting people back 
into gainful employment that Prime Minister Kok vindicated with a cognitive discourse claiming they had 
generated “jobs, jobs, and even more jobs, ” or the fact that the Dutch social welfare system remained 
ECLAC - Social Policy Series No. 178 Does discourse matter in the politics of building social pacts on social protection?... 
18 
reasonably generous (Hemerijck, Visser, and Unger, 2000; Green-Pedersen et al. 2001). It was also 
because of the government’s communicative discourse, which made the normative argument that they were 
safe-guarding social equity even as they produced liberalizing efficiency, for example, by attacking 
inefficient inequities such as paying disability to the able-bodied even as they sought to balance out the 
possible negative effects of wage restraint through compensatory, targeted tax breaks for low-wage 
workers (Levy, l999; Green-Pedersen et al. 2001; Schmidt 2002b, 2003). Since then, governments have 
continued broad-scale liberalization programs while the economy has prospered, such that the public has 
come to see economic success as linked to neo-liberal reform and, despite economic stagnation in recent 
years, continues to support it as well as to maintain a positive attitude toward globalization. Its siding with 
Germany on austerity policies and harsh conditionality for countries that used the loan bailout funds until at 
least late 2012, when a new coalition came to power, is testimony to the hold of neo-liberal ideas and 
discourse not just on labor but on the citizens generally. That said, as the centrist coalition continued to 
advocate further rapid deficit reduction through public sector wage freezes and general tax increases —
only putting off to 2014 reaching 3% deficit (at 3.3% in 2013)— the labor unions finally resisted, 
describing the cuts as “stupid and ill-advised” (Financial Times March 3, 2013), and resisting the Labor 
Party’s urging to take part in discussions about the cuts “to seize the opportunities offered by the new 
measures to stimulate the economy” —which, as Simon Wren-Lewis (2013) has noted, is a bit like “asking 
the Christmas turkey to talk about recipes for the stuffing”. 
2.  Sweden and Denmark 
Sweden and Denmark, as social democratic welfare states, had significantly different experiences from 
those of Germany and the Netherlands, but also from one another with regard to the negotiation of 
reform in work and welfare. In the case of welfare reform in Sweden in the 1990s, for example, the ideas 
for change emerged from a coordinative discourse that was highly restricted, consisting of an epistemic 
community of specialized politicians and policy experts alone because the famous concertation among 
business, labor, and government no longer worked for such macro-level reforms (Marier 2008), much as 
in the case of the Netherlands. But unlike in the Netherlands, where the lack of consultation or 
communicative led to public disaffection and government defeat in the mid 1990s, the Swedish 
government in this same time period vetted its reform proposals through a more open communicative 
discourse. This involved a kind of decentralized deliberative process in which social-democratic 
politicians sought to build legitimacy for reform by holding meetings in local communities, listening to 
responses, and changing their proposals accordingly (Schmidt 2003, p. 141). Moreover, in their 
communicative discourse, social-democratic leaders consistently presented themselves as defending 
basic welfare state values of equality, even as they cut benefits in order to ‘save the welfare state’, while 
promising to reinstitute benefits as soon as the country’s finances were better —which they did (Schmidt 
2000). It is only in relatively recently, with the election of an avowedly neo-liberal center right party in 
power that significant changes have occurred that may have permanently undermined the social-
democratic qualities of the Swedish welfare state.  
Whereas in Sweden, the state had to go it alone once the social partners had pulled out of 
centralized national level corporatist mechanisms of negotiation, in Denmark the reform process was 
facilitated by the continuation of centralized coordination, enabling the state to negotiate far-reaching 
reforms cooperatively with the social partners. This meant that in a range of work-related reforms, the 
Danish state was able to successfully promote policy change through national level coordination 
mechanisms. With regard to wage coordination, Denmark was better able to promote wage restraint 
centrally and labour flexibility locally than Sweden, and this in turn enabled it to better maintain overall 
commitments to equality than Sweden (Vartiainen l998). On active labor market policies, Denmark was 
better able to use firms in order to achieve its goals of bringing the long-term unemployed into the 
economy, unlike in Germany, where German firms worked through the state to achieve their goals of 
shedding unproductive labor (Martin and Thelen 2007). But while in the work arena, Denmark’s 
sustained centralized policy coordination help reform success, in the welfare arena it was the lack of 
sustained centralized political coordination that facilitated reform. In Denmark, the constitution of 
shifting ad hoc political coalitions facilitated the minority Social Democratic government’s ability to 
reform (Green-Pedersen et al. 2001). 
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C.  State-influenced market economies: France and Italy 
The trajectories of Italy and France, as state-influenced market economies, are polar opposites of one 
another both in terms of their responses to neo-liberal ideas, their discourse, and the ideational 
leadership. France in particular has had an ambivalent relationship to neo-liberal ideas, which never 
gained much ground as an ideology in public opinion. Political leaders in France have therefore often 
used a discourse about neo-liberal constraints opportunistically, by applying its principles whenever it 
advanced their policy agenda. But they were equally quick to push back or even develop legitimacy 
claims based on the arguments of the opponents of neo-liberalism throughout the party spectrum. In 
Italy, by contrast, neo-liberal ideas did gain ground, in particular among policy experts, but they were 
rarely put into practice by politicians, even when they claimed to embrace them, with Berlusconi a case 
in point.  
Significantly, Italy’s trajectory since the postwar years has taken it back and forth between 
opportunistic, ideologically-divided political leadership acting mostly as a hindrance to national economic 
development for long stretches of time, and pragmatic technocratic leadership for short moments at critical 
junctures which overcame both political and institutional constraints to liberalize and modernize. By 
contrast, France began with ideologically united (dirigiste) technocratic leadership in the postwar years that 
successfully promoted growth via an interventionist state and then moved to pragmatic political leadership 
since the 1980s that liberalized as it modernized (Gualmini and Schmidt 2013). 
The problem for France has been that ever since the early 1980s, French political elites have been 
in search of a new discourse that would serve to legitimize the country’s liberalizing economic 
transformation in a way that would resonate with national values of ‘social solidarity.’ In its absence, 
successive governments of the left and right have more often than not justified neo-liberal policy change 
by reference to the challenges of globalization, while claiming that further Europeanization served as a 
shield against globalization, and that neither liberalization nor Europeanization would do anything to 
jeopardize ‘social solidarity.’ Governments’ attempts to reform in response to the crisis of the welfare 
state as well as the need to meet the Maastricht criteria for the EMU were repeatedly stymied as a result 
of the lack of a discourse that spoke to the normative appropriateness —rather than just the cognitive 
necessity— of reform (Schmidt 1996, 2002 Ch. 6). That said, reforms that political leaders had difficulty 
legitimating to the general public they sometimes successfully brokered nevertheless with the social 
partners (Palier 2005). This was the case with Prime Minister Balladur’s reform of private sector 
pensions in 1993 that lengthened contribution time and lowered benefits, to which the social partners 
agreed on the basis of an ‘ambiguous consensus’ that balanced positive and negative benefits (Palier 
2006; Häuserman 2008). Consensus occurred despite the general absence of any communicative 
discourse to the public about reforms that were floated as ‘trial balloons,’ to be quickly withdrawn in the 
case of negative response (Levy 2000). By contrast, the 1995 attempt by Prime Minister Alain Juppé to 
impose reform of public pensions and of the ‘special regimes’ of the railroad workers was met by 
massive protest, as the highly unionized public sector, supported by the sympathetic public, paralyzed 
France for over three weeks. Here, the problem was not only entrenched interests but also that Juppé 
engaged in almost no discourse at all, whether communication to the public or coordination with the 
social partners. 
Interestingly, even when the Socialists in the late 1990s finally did come up with a discourse that 
served to legitimate reform by balancing cognitive arguments about efficiency with normative 
arguments about equity —for example, by claiming ‘neither to soak the rich nor let them shirk their 
obligations’ with regard to tax reforms— they did not tackle the major pension problems for fear of 
protests (Levy 1999; Schmidt 2000). But this did set the stage for public acceptance of Prime Minister 
Raffarin’s major reforms of public sector pensions in 2003, despite his minimal communicative 
discourse, because of an extensive coordinative discourse again balancing positive and negative benefits 
(Natali and Rhodes 2004; Palier 2006; Häuserman 2008). Notably, President Sarkozy’s success with the 
2007 reform initiative on the special pension regimes that had failed so dramatically twelve years before 
can be explained in large part by his ability to reframe the issue in a communicative discourse that 
resonated with the concept of equality central to the French republican tradition, with a normative 
ECLAC - Social Policy Series No. 178 Does discourse matter in the politics of building social pacts on social protection?... 
20 
argument insisting that equality of treatment demanded that railroad workers retire like everyone else 
after 40 years of employment (rather than at age fifty for railroad conductors). The power of the 
discourse was such that union leaders themselves acknowledged to the media that the most they could do 
was engage in rearguard action with a communicative discourse focused on those whose ‘difficult work’ 
entitled them to earlier retirement, and accept coordinative negotiations in which they hoped to recoup 
their losses through side-payments in exchange for labor peace (Schmidt 2009).  
Only with the return of the Socialists to power in 2012 has major renegotiation through social 
pacts occurred, with an agreement signed by the social partners in January 2013 (to be voted on by the 
French Parliament in the spring) that introduces greater ‘flexicurity,’ building on Danish ideas. This is to 
allow companies in trouble to negotiate reduction in working hours (through flex time) and wages for up 
to two years as well as to reassign workers and to have caps on laid-off workers’ labor court awards in 
exchange for paying more of lower wage workers’ health care costs, a payroll tax surcharge on short-
term hiring (to discourage it), a workers’ representative on the boards of major enterprises, and retention 
by laid off workers of their accumulated unemployment benefits when they returned to work (to reduce 
incentives to stay on the dole). Even more importantly, whereas Peugeot decided to lay off workers and 
close a plant with little social concertation, to much criticism from the government, Renault reached a 
‘historic’ (because consensual) agreement with all unions other than the CGT in which 17% of its 
workers in France would be laid off over three years, all workers would have a wage freeze, and a longer 
work week (up from 32 to 35 hours) in exchange for no plant closures before 2016 and an increase in the 
numbers of cars manufactured (Financial Times March 13, 2013). 
Thus, France’s reform trajectory tended to be incremental, as the ‘strong state’ actors of this 
simple polity and state-influenced market economy proved weak with regard to coordinating reform 
efforts with the social partners, let alone communicating their legitimacy to the general public. In 
comparison, Italy was able to engage in major reform only at critical junctures, when the ‘weak state’ 
actors of this compound polity and ‘state-hindered’ market economy were replaced by technocratic elites 
who managed to institute major reforms in the mid 1990s, after the collapse of the postwar Italian party 
system following the demise of the Soviet Union, and again in the late 2000s, in the midst of the 
Eurozone’s sovereign debt crisis.  
Italy was able to put through major reforms in work and welfare in the 1990s, as it sought to join 
the European Monetary Union on time, by mustering both a successful coordinative discourse with labor 
and a communicative discourse with the general public. Italian leaders’ communicative discourse spoke 
to the cognitive necessity of reform by invoking the EU as a vincolo esterno —the external constraint or, 
better, ‘opportunity’— along with the normative appeals to national pride in making the sacrifices 
required to ensure that Italy joined EMU from the start (Radaelli 2002: 225-6) and to social equity —to 
end unfairness and corruption as well as to give ‘piu ai figli, meno ai padri,’ more to the sons, less to the 
fathers, so as to ensure intergenerational solidarity (Ferrera and Gualmini 2004; Schmidt 2000). This 
communicative discourse was accompanied by an equally effective coordinative discourse with the 
unions that at various junctures engaged not just national union leaders with business and government in 
tripartite discussions but also the entire union rank and file in deliberations that culminated in a 
referendum that ensured that opposing union members would accept the ‘procedural justice’ of the vote, 
and therefore not stage wildcats strikes, as they had in the past (Regini and Regalia l997; Locke and 
Baccaro 1999).  
Under the center right governments of Prime Minister Berlusconi, by contrast, both in his short 
tenure in 1994 and his longer ones from 2001 to 2006 and between 2008 and 2011, did none of this. 
Instead, he used a communicative discourse to the general public to accuse all of the left, and by 
extension the unions, of being communists, and had little productive coordinative discourse. As a result, 
his attempts to impose policies failed time and again in the face of union strikes. Moreover, what few 
measures that were taken were done with no coordinative discourse with the social partners —unlike in 
the 1990s— nor with the Parliament because of the “command and control” decision making style of the 
Premier on the one side, and the rigid European budgetary constraints on the other (Gualmini and 
Schmidt 2013). Only with the one-year technocratic government of Mario Monti did concertation return, 
as the coordinative discourse with the social partners led to major adjustment in the pension regime and 
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with regard to labor market flexibility under the existential threat of the markets and the pressures of 
Eurozone governments, which Monti repeatedly mentioned in his communicative discourse to legitimate 
reform. But while the reform efforts were reasonably successful, they appeared less and less legitimate 
as the public became increasingly disenchanted. 
D.  Emerging market economies: Brazil and South Africa 
Arguably the best comparative cases among emerging market economies are Brazil and South Africa, 
since both undertook recent reforms of work and welfare. The difference is that whereas Brazil’s reform 
process led to new and productive forms of coordinative and communicative discourse on work and 
welfare that helped produce a new sustainable universal social security system based on ‘fiscally sound 
social inclusion’ (Alston et al. 2013), in South Africa the results were not as positive. 
In Brazil, the institutional bases for work and welfare reform were already laid with the 
Constitution of 1988, which established a universal set of social rights for all citizens. But this did not 
guarantee their implementation, given economic constraints related to the macroeconomic adjustment 
agenda and resistance by powerful actors (Fleury 2011). And yet, by the late 2000s it was clear that 
Brazil had undergone a decisive shift in beliefs society wide in which agreement on the importance of 
‘fiscally sound social inclusion’ had produced highly positive results, even if the substantive process of 
getting there had involved ‘dissipative inclusion,’ in which redistribution and socially inclusive policies 
were accompanied by distortions, inefficiencies and rent dissipation (Alston et al. 2013). The interactive 
processes that produced such results involved both bottom up and top down interactions.  
With regard to bottom up interactions, in addition to the democratization pressures from citizens 
that resulted in the Constitution and its commitment to universal social rights, labor unions and social 
movements were also key actors (Fleury 2011). For example, social movements played a particularly 
important role in promoting the development of universal public health care, once ‘subversives,’ 
consisting of the sanitario social movement activists with over-arching ideas about the need for 
universal health care delivered in a decentralized manner, managed to infiltrate the bureaucracy and to 
persuade even authoritarian governments to layer on new rules (Falletti 2009; see also Fleury 2011). 
Labor also played a major role in pushing for greater social inclusion, and this was facilitated 
equally by pressures from above, with the election of President Lula beginning in 2002. While labor in 
the neo-liberal period of the 1980s through the mid 1990s remained largely outside the circuits of power, 
as it negotiated with management for a piece of the pie, in the 2000s under Lula it was incorporated into 
those circuits, as union leaders were named as heads of major public enterprises, as labor was included 
in the policy formulation process, and as labor pension funds became a key actor in the financial markets 
(Boschi 2013). President Lula, moreover, could be seen as a pragmatic ‘ideational entrepreneur’ whose 
philosophical ideas about social justice and the policy program to bring it about through jobs, training, 
and welfare were successful not just because they worked but also because he was first able to persuade 
big business and the rising middle classes that although these reforms would make the rich pay more in 
taxes, it would boost productivity, income, and prosperity for all. Once this happened, moreover, the 
entire population became convinced, including the poor who were now finding jobs and had money in 
their pockets to spend, thus boosting consumption and increasing wealth (Boschi 2013).  
President Lula not only had a persuasive communicative discourse of social justice and economic 
reform that resonated with the citizens and business, however. He also created the conditions for a 
coordinative discourse that included labor in the development of policy. Although for some this seemed 
a return to authoritarian corporatism, it was actually a way to create a more inclusive policy community, 
in which a new channel of communication was opened up with civil society, as represented by labor 
unions. At the same time in another venue, the high level CDES (Council of Economic and Social 
Development) constituted an inclusive consultative body focused on the creation of consensus while 
establishing guidelines for development and guiding principles for the different spheres of government. 
Finally, under the new President Dilma Rousseff, a further coordinative effort to improve economic 
performance by creating a Chamber for Competitiveness in which business would gain from discursive 
interaction with academics and experts (Boschi 2013).  
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South Africa makes for an interesting case with regard to labor because it sought to create a 
coordinated market economy or corporatist kind of relationship between business and labor in the 1990s, 
and failed. The problems were with both the unions and business, and this despite the fact that South 
Africa had developed a reasonably successful coordinative discourse in certain cases that, rather than top 
down, was very much bottom up as the ideas were developed in the negotiating process (Natrass 2013). 
With regard to political economic reform in particular, the restricted coordinative policy discourse that 
had been limited to the ANC opened up to more social democratic and neoliberal formulation through a 
process in which ideas were shaped through active discussion, deliberation, and contestation with 
economists, political strategists, international institutions, and others. The ideas themselves came out of 
several high-level 'scenario planning' exercises that made policy makers much more concerned about 
issues related to macro economic stability than they had been heretofore and in the end also became 
collectively ‘owned’ as a common set of shared ideas. Although they did not translate entirely into the 
communicative discourse of all political elites in the public arena (given Malema's calls for 
nationalisation of the mines), it was nevertheless the case that Malema was himself constrained by 
having to accept a market system. He had to give up on ‘socialism’ per se and instead engage in arguing 
about the role of the state and the kind and degree of redistribution that was appropriate. Importantly, as 
part of this process, President Mandela also acted as an ideational leader when he reversed his position 
on nationalization after going to China, when the new Chinese leader Li Peng said —and he repeated 
everywhere in a highly effective coordinative discourse with the ANC and in communication with 
investors— ‘I don’t understand why you are talking about nationalisation. You’re not even a communist 
party. I am the leader of the communist party in China and I’m talking privatisation’ (Green, 2008: 345-
6-cited in Natrass 2013). 
The coordinative discourse with the labor unions did not work as well, in particular because they 
did not buy into the results of the coordinative discourse on macroeconomic and industrial policy. 
Despite the significant influence of social democratic ideas circulated by think tanks and experts coming 
from advanced industrialized countries like Germany, Austria, and the US in the early 1990s, the 
coordinative discourse between government and trade unions failed. This is because labor stuck to its 
ideas of class conflict, and claimed that the government had sold them out with regard to its turnaround 
on economic policy. They continued to push for ‘decent work’, and wanted a ‘developmental state.’ So 
the government compromised by giving unions control over labor policy and increasingly over aspects 
of industrial policy. While this was politically beneficial, improving stability and labor relations, it was 
not economically, as ‘dissipative inclusion’ was highly dissipative, as wages grew more quickly than 
productivity, and thereby decreased the country’s competitiveness. 
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Conclusion 
Social pacts since the 1980s have altered the landscape of work and welfare in advanced industrialized 
and emerging market economies. This has resulted not just from the increasing importance of neo-liberal 
ideas or from the pushback of social democratic ones. It has also resulted from the interactive processes 
of discourse through which policy actors coordinated agreements on reforms of work and welfare and 
political actors communicated about these. Discourse, in short, always matters, for better or worse in 
social pacts on social protection.  
. 
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